Delegation, Overconfidence, and Welfare in a Differentiated Duopoly by Tondji, Jean-Baptise
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications 
and Presentations 
Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
3-16-2020 
Delegation, Overconfidence, and Welfare in a Differentiated 
Duopoly 
Jean-Baptise Tondji 
The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tondji, Jean-Baptiste, Delegation, Overconfidence, and Welfare in a Differentiated Duopoly (March 16, 
2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555348 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3555348 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics and Finance Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, 
please contact justin.white@utrgv.edu, william.flores01@utrgv.edu. 
Delegation, overconfidence, and welfare in a differentiated
duopoly?
Jean-Baptiste Tondji1,∗
1201 W. University Dr., ECOBE 216, Edinburg, Texas, 78539, USA
Abstract
We derive Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly in which each
firm hires a manager to undertake research and development (R&D) and production
decisions. We show that manager overconfidence and over-investment occur in each
market competition. Furthermore, the Cournot game induces a higher level of overcon-
fidence and more R&D investments than Bertrand game. However, if R&D spillovers
are strong, the price is lower, and output is more abundant in Bertrand than in Cournot
game. Furthermore, Cournot and Bertrand models with overconfident managers in-
duce low prices, massive productions, and are more efficient if R&D productivity is
low and spillovers are strong. We also show that if firms can only make two types of
binding contracts with shareholders, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose
the delegation contract.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we argue that individual characteristics of managers, such as overconfi-
dence or over-optimism, in decentralized corporations improve welfare. In particular,
we examine the investment and production decisions of managers who overestimate the
intercept of future demands of their companies. We find that firms always hire over-
confident managers, and they over-invest in cost-reducing R&D. The efficiency in pro-
duction allows firms to expand outputs, reduce prices, which then leads to an increase
in social welfare—the aggregate sum of consumer surplus and producer profits—in
markets.
Recent studies of product-market competition in corporations mostly focus on the
reasons firms hire overconfident managers (Goel and Thakor (2008), Englmaier (2010),
Yu (2014), Pu et al. (2017)) and the effects of managerial overconfidence on innovation
(Einhorn (1980), Eberhart et al. (2004), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Galasso
and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2014), Li et al. (2019)), on
mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate (2008)), and leadership (Phua et al.
(2018)). From the best of our knowledge, none of these studies explores the effects of
managerial overconfidence on social welfare. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in
the literature.
In sections 2 and 3, we first consider a three-stage duopoly model in which two firms
compete in the product market. Our model augments the Qiu (1997) model by includ-
ing the delegation stage with (possible) biased managers. The demand structure is lin-
ear and allows products to be substitutes. Before the product competition stage, firms
hire managers, who have personal beliefs about the market, to take charge of R&D in-
vestments and production decisions. Following the existing literature (Englmaier (2010,
2011), Yu (2014), Li et al. (2019)), we ignore the agency conflict between firms and
managers and assume that managers choose the investment level to maximize firms’
profits (according to their beliefs) net of R&D expenditures. Following d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), we assume that R&D investments exhibit spillover effects. In
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this framework, assuming mild assumptions on R&D technology, we determine the
equilibrium when either Cournot or Bertrand game characterizes the product-market.
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria are unique. We show that overconfidence and over-
investment occur as an equilibrium outcome independent of the mode of competition,
that is, price or quantities. Cournot game induces a higher level of overconfidence
and more R&D investments than Bertrand game. Relative to the models without del-
egation, differentiated duopoly with overconfident managers produce low prices and
large outputs. If R&D spillovers are strong, the price is lower, and production is more
abundant in Bertrand than in Cournot mode. Therefore, consumer surplus is higher
in Bertrand than in the Cournot game. Furthermore, we show that if R&D produc-
tivity is low and spillovers are strong, delegation with overconfident managers is more
efficient, in the sense that in equilibrium, consumer surplus and producer profits are
higher relative to the setting without delegation.
Building on the works of Singh and Vives (1984) and Kyle and Wang (1997), we
suppose in section 4, that each firm can make only two types of binding contracts with
shareholders: the delegation contract and the non-delegation contract. If a firm chooses
the delegation contract, this means that it will have to delegate the R&D investments
and production decisions to a manager whatever action the competitor takes. If a
firm chooses the non-delegation contract, it commits to making its strategic decisions
without hiring a manager independently of the action of the competitor. Consider
a four-stage game where firms first simultaneously commit themselves to a type of
contract and afterward compete depending upon the chosen models of contracts and
the three-stage game under either price or quantity competition. Restricting attention
to sub-game perfect equilibria of the dynamic game, we show that it is a dominant
strategy for a firm to choose the delegation contract and hire an overconfident manager.
This result indicates that delegation and overconfidence may persist and survive in the
long run.
3
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2. The Basic Model and Cournot Equilibrium
Consider a sector of an economy with two firms i = 1, 2 producing differentiated
goods q1 and q2 respectively. Following Singh and Vives (1984), we assume that the
representative consumer’s utility function is U(q1, q2) = a(q1 +q2)−(q21 +2bq1q2 +q22)/2,
a > 0 is the true market size, and b ∈ (0, 1) is the degree of product differentiation,
with differentiation increasing as b is close to zero. The inverse market demands are
linear:
pi = a− qi − bqj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (1)
Firms may invest in cost-reducing R&D. The pre-innovation cost for each firm is c,
with a > c. If firm i engages in R&D, then by spending V (xi) on R&D, it lowers its
marginal cost by xi + βxj: ci = c− xi − βxj, where the parameter β ∈ [0, 1] captures
the extend of output spillovers (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)). We assume that
V (xi) = v
x2i
2
, where v relates to the productivity of the R&D technology (higher v
means lower productivity).
Timing is the following.
Stage 1. Each firm hires a manager to take charge of R&D investments and pro-
duction decisions. Managers have different personalities (types or beliefs) and may
over-estimate or under-estimate the size of the market. Following Yu (2014), we as-
sume that there is at least two managers for each type so that the matching between
firms and managers is always perfect. Managers’ types are observable both to firms
and competing managers. If firm i hires manager of type αi, he or she believes that
the inverse market demand of firm i is:
pi = αi − qi − bqj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2)
In line with the literature (see, e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Galasso and
Simcoe (2011), Yu (2014), Li et al. (2019)), an overconfident manager over-estimate
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the true (or real) intercept of the demand function, i.e., αi > a.
Stage 2. Managers simultaneously and independently undertake cost-reducing R&D
based on their own beliefs about the market. As mentioned in the Introduction, we
assume that the objectives of the managers are aligned with shareholders’ goals after
being hired.
Stage 3. The real market size is realized, and both firms produce and sell their
products to consumers.
In this section, we only consider Cournot competition, where firms compete by setting
quantities in the market stage. In section 3, we discuss Bertrand competition, a setting
in which firms compete in prices. We derive sub-game perfect Nash equilibria using
backward induction. For clarity, we relegate the proofs of our results in the appendix.
Assume:
A1. v > 2a/c.
Assumption A1 ensures that every sub-game after the initial stage has a unique Nash
equilibrium with both firms (and managers) in the quantity competition.
Let piiC denote firm i’s market profit (profit excluding R&D costs) after the real market
is revealed in stage 3. Given any R&D outcome (xi, xj),
piiC(qi, qj;xi, xj) = piqi − (c− xi − βxj)qi. (3)
Firms choose outputs to maximize their respective market profits, and the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is
q∗i (xi, xj) =
1
(4− b2) [(a− c)(2− b) + (2− bβ)xi + (2β − b)xj], (4)
and firm i’s overall market profit ΠiC(xi, xj) = pi
i
C(q
∗
i , q
∗
j ;xi, xj)− V (xi) is:
5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555348
[(2− b)(a− c) + (2− bβ)xi + (2β − b)xj]2
(4− b2)2 − v
x2i
2
. (5)
Note from (4) that
∂q∗i
∂xi
= 2−bβ
4−b2 , and
∂q∗i
∂xj
= 2β−b
4−b2 . It follows that
∂q∗i
∂xi
> 0, for any b and
β, and
∂q∗i
∂xj
> 0 if β > b
2
. Turning to the second stage, based on their beliefs about the
market in (2), each manager undertakes an R&D level to maximize the firm’s expected
overall profit
ΠiC(xi, xj) =
[(2− b)(αi − c) + (2− bβ)xi + (2β − b)xj]2
(4− b2)2 − v
x2i
2
. (6)
Using the first-order conditions, manager i’s best R&D strategy in response to firm j’s
choice of R&D level xj is:
xi(αi, xj) =
2(2− bβ)
v(4− b2)2 − 2(2− bβ)2 [(2− b)(αi − c) + (2β − b)xj]. (7)
Given (7) and symmetry, firm i’s R&D investment level is provided by
x∗i (αi, αj) =
2(2− b)(2− bβ)
Λ
xi(αi, αj), (8)
where xi(αi, αj) = [(4−b2)2v−2(2−bβ)2]αi+2(2−bβ)(2β−b)αj+[2(2−bβ)(2+b)(1−β)−
(4−b2)2v]c, for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, and Λ = [(4−b2)2v−2(2−bβ)2]2−4(2β−b)2(2−bβ)2.
Given (7), we have
∂xi(αi,xj)
∂xj
= 2(2−bβ)(2β−b)
v(4−b2)2−2(2−bβ)2 , and using (8), it follows that, for
i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j:
∂x∗i
∂αi
=
2(2− b)(2− bβ)
Λ
[(4− b2)2v − 2(2− bβ)2], and, (9)
∂x∗i
∂αj
=
4(2− b)(2− bβ)2
Λ
(2β − b). (10)
Under A1, v > 2(2−bβ)
2
(4−b2)2 , and Λ > 0. Therefore, it is immediate that
∂x∗i
∂αi
> 0, and
∂xi(αi,xj)
∂xj
> 0 if and only if β > b
2
. Similarly, the sign of
∂x∗i
∂αj
depends on the sign of
6
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(2β − b). Hence, if 0 < β < b
2
, then
∂x∗i
∂αj
< 0, and, if 1 > β > b
2
, we have
∂x∗i
∂αj
> 0.
Now, in the initial stage, firms simultaneously choose a manager of type αi to maximize
their expected profits. Substituting (8) into (5), firm i’s profit is
ΠiC(x
∗
i , x
∗
j) =
[(2− b)(a− c) + (2− bβ)x∗i (αi, αj) + (2β − b)x∗j(αi, αj)]2
(4− b2)2 −v
[x∗i (αi, αj)]
2
2
.
By the first-order conditions and symmetry, firms hire a manager with a confidence
level
αC = a+
2(a− c)v
∆C
(2 + b)(2β − b)2 (11)
where ∆C = 4(1−β)(2−bβ)(1+β)2−2(2+b)[4−b+2(1−b)β](2−bβ)v+(2−b)2(2+b)3v2,
the latter being positive under A1.
Note that in case of no delegation in the first stage (i.e., αi = αj = a), the symmetric
equilibrium outcomes are: xnc =
2(2−bβ)(a−c)
∆
, qnc =
1
∆
v(a − c)(4 − b2), and pnc =
a− (1 + b)qnc, where ∆ = (2 + b)(4− b2)v − 2(1 + β)(2− bβ) > 0 under A1.
Substituting αC into (8) yields the symmetric equilibrium R&D investment level:
xC =
{
1 +
2(2 + b)(2β − b)2v
∆C
}
xnc. (12)
A1 guarantees positive post-innovation costs of production in Cournot competition,
i.e., c − (1 + β)xC > 0. Note that if R&D investments are very productive, the firms
will invest more to gain a competitive advantage in the market game which will lead
to zero, and even negative post-innovation costs.2
2Note that Qiu (1997) uses a weaker assumption for Cournot competition, v >
a
c
, and a more robust assumption v >
2(2−b2−bβ)2
(1−b2)(4−b2)2 for Bertrand competition. Also,
Semenov and Tondji (2019) use the assumption v > 3α
c
for Cournot-Bertrand game.
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Substituting xC into (4) and (1) yield the (symmetric) equilibrium output and price:
qC =
(a− c)v
∆C
{
(4− b2)2v − 2(2− bβ)2} , and pC = a− (1 + b)qC . (13)
Finally, equilibrium consumer surplus [CS = U(q1, q2) − p1q1 − p2q2 = (1 + b)(qC)2],
producer profits [Π = Π1 + Π2 = 2(qC)
2 − v(xC)2], and welfare [W = CS + Π] in
Cournot competition are given as:
CSC =
(1 + b)(a− c)2v2
∆2C
{
(4− b2)2v − 2(2− bβ)2}2 ,
ΠC =
2(a− c)2v
∆2C
v[(4− b
2)2v − 2(2− bβ)2]2
− 2(2− bβ)2[2(1− β2)− (4− b2)v]2
 ,
WC =
(a− c)2v
∆2C
(1 + b)v[(4− b
2)2v − 2(2− bβ)2]2 + 2[v((4− b2)2v
− 2(2− bβ)2)2 − 2(2− bβ)2(2− 2β2 − (4− b2)v)2]
 .
Remark 1 An immediate analysis of (11) and (12) suggests that αC > a and xC > xnc.
It follows that in equilibrium, both firms choose overconfident managers, and over-
investment occurs. 2
Let’s look at how the degree of product differentiation affects the level of overconfidence
in equilibrium. Using (11):
∂αC
∂b
=
4(2β − b)(a− c)v
∆2C
A(b, β),
where A(b, β) = 4(1−β)(1 +β)2[−4− 3b+ (2 + b+ b2)β+ 2β2]− 2(2 + b)2(1−β2)[(b+
4bβ − 2(4 + β)]v− (2− b)(2 + b)3(4 + b2− 4bβ)v2 < 0 under A1. Therefore, ∂αC
∂b
< 0 if
and only if β > b
2
. The latter implies that when there is closer substitutability between
8
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products, firms hire less confident managers when innovation is easily accessible by
competitors. Using equation (8):
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂b
=
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂αi
∂b︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂αj
∂b︸︷︷︸
−
< 0 if β >
b
2
, and (14)
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂b
=
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂αi
∂b︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αj︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂αj
∂b︸︷︷︸
+
≷ 0 if β < b
2
. (15)
Equation (14) is a direct implication of the argument mentioned above on confidence
levels and product substitutability. However, the net effect of product differentiation
on the levels of R&D investments is ambiguous when spillover effects are relatively low
(Eq. (15)). We also note that:
∂αC
∂c
= −2(2 + b)(2β − b)
2v
∆C
, and
∂xC
∂c
= −2(2− bβ) {(4− b
2)v − 2(1− β2)}
∆C
.
Under A1, and β 6= b
2
, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium level of
managers’ overconfidence and the size of R&D investment levels decrease with initial
production cost, c, i.e., ∂αC
∂c
< 0 and ∂xC
∂c
< 0. This analysis, and Remark 1 both
generalize the results of previous findings on delegation and process innovation under
Cournot competition (Englmaier (2010), Yu (2014), Li et al. (2019)). In these studies,
the authors assume that either the productivity of the R&D technology is constant
(v = 1) or there is zero R&D spillover effects (β = 0).
Remark 2 In case of no delegation at the initial stage, the producer surplus is Πnc =
2(a−c)2v
∆2
[(4− b2)2v− 2(2− bβ)2], the consumer surplus is CSnc = (1+b)(4−b2)2(a−c)2v2∆2 , and
welfare is Wnc =
(a−c)2v
∆2
[(3 + b)(4− b2)2v − 4(2− bβ)2]. 2
Comparisons based on market equilibrium outcomes under quantity competition with
possible overconfident managers with those obtained in a game without delegation
(Remark 2) yield the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 For any b ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1), with β 6= b
2
.
(a) qC > qnc, and pC < pnc. Consequently, CSC > CSnc.
(b) ΠC > Πnc if and only if β >
b
2
.
(c) There exists a unique v1 = v1(b, β) such that WC −Wnc =
> 0 if v > v1< 0 if v < v1. 2
Proposition 1 implies that overconfident managers make decisions that induce higher
productions, lower prices, and higher consumer surplus. Also, if the extend of spillover
effects is sufficiently strong (β > b
2
), then delegation increases profits, and therefore
welfare. In the case of weak spillover effects (β < b
2
), then, according to (c), over-
confidence improves welfare if the R&D technology is less productive (v > v1). In
fact, for any b ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) so that β > b
2
, the inequality v > v1 always
holds under A1, and therefore WC > Wnc. Also, under A1, v < v1 only holds when
the R&D spillover effects are relatively low (i.e., β is small), and the product market
is almost homogeneous (i.e., b is sufficiently high and close to 1). We illustrate this
situation in Figure 1 for parameters: a = 1, c = 0.955, β = 0.001, b = 0.93, and
v1 = 2.49068 >
2a
c
= 2.09424.
v1 4 6 8 10
v
-2.×10-7
2.×10-7
4.×10-7
WC -Wnc
Figure 1: Difference in welfare
It follows that under sufficiently product differentiation, and assuming that the R&D
technology is less efficient (i.e., A1 is satisfied), even if the R&D spillover effects is
10
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low, we expect the difference in welfare to be positive. We illustrate this situation in
Figure 2 for parameters a = 1, c = 0.955, β = 0.001, and b = 0.9.
4 6 8 10
v
2.×10-7
4.×10-7
6.×10-7
8.×10-7
1.×10-6
1.2×10-6
1.4×10-6
WC -Wnc
Figure 2: Difference in welfare
In the next section, we discuss Bertrand competition, a framework in which firms
compete in prices.
3. Bertrand Equilibrium
Suppose now that in the product market, firms compete in prices. Rewriting market
demands in (1) gives us:
qi =
1
1− b2 {a(1− b)− pi + bpj} , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (16)
Assume:
A2. β > b
2−b2 .
Assumption A2 implies that the extend of spillover effects are sufficiently strong. As-
sumptions A1 and A2 are sufficient, but not necessary for the second-order and the
stability conditions in the price competition.
Let piiB denote firm i’s market profit (profit excluding R&D costs) after the real mar-
ket is revealed. Given any R&D outcome (xi, xj) in stage 2, firm i in the market
competition stage choose price pi to maximize its market profits pi
i
B. The resulting
11
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Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is
p∗i (xi, xj) =
1
4− b2
{
a(2− b− b2) + (2 + b)c− (2 + bβ)xi − (b+ 2β)xj
}
, (17)
and firm i’s overall market profit ΠiB(xi, xj) = pi
i
B(p
∗
i , p
∗
j ;xi, xj)− V (xi) is:
[(2− b− b2)(a− c) + (2− b2 − bβ)xi + ((2− b2)β − b)xj]2
(1− b2)(4− b2)2 − v
x2i
2
. (18)
Using (17), it is straightforward to observe that both
∂p∗i
∂xi
= −2+bβ
4−b2 , and
∂p∗i
∂xj
= − b+2β
4−b2 are
negative for any b and β. Similarly, substituting (17) into (16) yield
∂q∗i
∂xi
= 2−b(b+β)
4−5b2+b4 > 0,
and
∂q∗i
∂xj
= −b−(2−b
2)β
4−5b2+b4 > 0 under A2. The latter confirms the incentive for firms to invest
in cost-reducing R&D. Investments enable firms to extend the production, given the
reduction in marginal costs, and this translates to a decline in prices.
Turning to the second stage, on the basis that the market demand is
qi =
1
1− b2 {αi(1− b)− pi + bpj} , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (19)
manager of confidence level αi undertakes an R&D level to maximize the firm overall
profit
ΠiB(xi, xj) =
[(2− b− b2)(αi − c) + (2− b2 − bβ)xi + ((2− b2)β − b)xj]2
(1− b2)(4− b2)2 − v
x2i
2
.
Using the first-order conditions, manager i’s best R&D strategy in response to firm j’s
choice of R&D level xj is:
xi(αi, xj) =
2(2− b2 − bβ)
v(1− b2)(4− b2)2 − 2(2− b2 − bβ)2 [(2−b−b
2)(αi−c)+((2−b2)β−b)xj].
(20)
Given (20) and symmetry, firm i’s R&D investment level is provided by
x∗i (αi, αj) =
2(2− b− b2)(2− b2 − bβ)
χ
yi(αi, αj), (21)
12
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and firm j’s R&D investment level is given by
x∗j(αi, αj) =
2(4− 5b2 + b4)(2− b2 − bβ)
(2− b)(1 + b)χ yj(αi, αj), (22)
where yi = [(4 − b2)2(1 − b2)v − 2(2 − b2 − bβ)(2 − b2 − bβ)]αi + 2(2 − b2 − bβ)(2β −
b− b2β)αj + [2(2− b2− bβ)(1 + b)(2− b)(1− β)− (4− b2)2(1− b2)v]c, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
and χ = [2(2− b2 − bβ))2 − (4− b2)2(1− b2)v]2 − 4(2β − b− b2β)2(2− b2 − bβ)2.
Let’s look at the effects of confidence levels on R&D investments. Given (21), we have:
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αi
=
2(2− b− b2)(2− b2 − bβ)
χ
{
(4− b2)2(1− b2)v − 2(2− b2 − bβ)2} , and,
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αj
=
4(2− b− b2)(2− b2 − bβ)2
χ
{
(2β − b2β − b)} .
Similarly, using (22), we have:
∂x∗j(αi, αj)
∂αi
=
2(4− 5b2 + b4)(2− b2 − bβ)2
(2− b)(1 + b)χ
{
(2β − b2β − b)} , and,
∂x∗j(αi, αj)
∂αj
=
2(4− 5b2 + b4)(2− b2 − bβ)
(2− b)(1 + b)χ
{
(4− b2)2(1− b2)v − 2(2− b2 − bβ)2} .
Under A1, we have (4−b2)2(1−b2)v−2(2−b2−bβ)2 > 0 and χ > 0 so that ∂x∗i (αi,αj)
∂αi
> 0
and
∂x∗j (αi,αj)
∂αj
> 0. Given that b
2−b2 < β < 1 under A2, it follows that (2β−b2β−b) > 0
so that
∂x∗j (αi,αj)
∂αi
> 0 and
∂x∗i (αi,αj)
∂αj
> 0. It follows that R&D investments are positively
correlated with confidence levels.
In the initial stage (stage 1), firms simultaneously choose a manager of type αi to
maximize their expected profits. Substituting (21) and (22) into (18), firm i’s profit is
ΠiB(x
∗
i , x
∗
j) =
[(2− b− b2)(a− c) + (2− b2 − bβ)x∗i + ((2− b2)β − b)x∗j ]2
(1− b2)(4− b2)2 − v
(x∗i )
2
2
.
By the first-order conditions and symmetry, firms hire a manager with a confidence
13
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level:
αB = a+
(a− c)v
∆B
{
2(2− b)(2β − b2β − b)2} , (23)
where ∆B = 4(1− b)(1− β2)(1 + β)(2− b2 − bβ) + 2(2− b)(b+ 2bβ − 4− 2β + 2b2 +
b2β)(2− b2 − bβ)v + (2− b)(1− b2)(4− b2)2v2.
In case of no delegation in stage 1, the symmetric equilibrium outcomes in Bertrand
competition are: xnb =
2(2−bβ−b2)(a−c)
Φ
, pnb =
1
Φ
[v(a−ab+c)(1+b)(4−b2)−2a(1+β)(2−
b2−bβ)], and qnb = 1Φ(4−b2)(a−c)v, where Φ = (2−b)(1+b)(4−b2)v−2(1+β)(2−b2−bβ)
is positive under A1 and A2.
Substituting αB into (21) and (22) yield the equilibrium R&D investment level:
xB =
{
1 +
2(2− b)(2β − b2β − b)2v
∆B
}
xnb. (24)
Both assumptions A1 and A2 insure that c− (1 + β)xB > 0 (positive post-innovation
costs). Substituting (24) in (16) and (17) yield the market equilibrium outcome:
pB =
1
∆B
4a(1− b)(1 + β)(1− β
2)(2− b2 − bβ) + (4− b2)2(1− b2)(a(1− b) + c)v2
− 2(2− b2 − bβ){a(1− b)[6 + 4β − bβ − 2b2 − b2β] + (2− b2 − bβ)c}

qB =
(a− c)v
(1 + b)∆B
{
v(4− b2)2(1− b2)− 2(2− b2 − bβ)2}
(25)
Finally, we determine the equilibrium consumer surplus, producer profits, and welfare
in Bertrand competition:
CSB = (1 + b)(q
B)2 =
(a− c)2v2
(1 + b)∆2B
{
v(4− b2)2(1− b2)− 2(2− b2 − bβ)2}2 ,
ΠB = 2(1− b2)(qB)2 − v(xB)2,
WB = CSB + ΠB.
14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555348
The following remark occurs in equilibrium.
Remark 3 Using (23) and (24), it is evident that αB > a and xB > xnb. Consequently,
in equilibrium, both firms choose overoptimistic managers, and they over-invest in
R&D. 2
Using a similar approach in Cournot competition, we show that the degree of product
differentiation is negatively correlated to the hiring of overconfident managers (i.e.,
∂αB
∂b
< 0). Consistent with Cournot, product substitutability between products induce
managers to increase R&D investments. In fact:
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂b
=
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αi︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂αi
∂b︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂x∗i (αi, αj)
∂αj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂αj
∂b︸︷︷︸
−
< 0 if β >
b
2− b2 .
Furthermore, note that:
∂αB
∂c
= −2(2− b)(2β − b
2β − b)2v
∆B
, and
∂xB
∂c
= −2(1− b)(2− b
2 − bβ)
∆B
{
(4− b2)v − 2(1− β2)} .
Given A1 and A2, we have ∂αB
∂c
< 0 and ∂xB
∂c
< 0. Therefore, the equilibrium level of
managers’ overconfidence and R&D investment levels decrease with initial production
cost.
Remark 4 In case of no delegation in stage 1, the producer surplus is Πnb =
2(a−c)2v
Φ2
[v(4−
b2)2(1− b2)− 2(2− b2 − bβ)2], the consumer surplus is CSnb = (a−c)2v2Φ2 (1 + b)(4− b2)2,
and welfare is Wnb =
(a−c)2v
Φ2
[v(3 + b− 2b2)(4− b2)2 − 4(2− b2 − bβ)2]. 2
By comparing market equilibrium outcomes under Bertrand competition with possible
overconfident managers with those obtained in a game without delegation (Remark 4),
we get the proposition hereunder.
Proposition 2 For any b ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1), with β 6= b
2−b2 .
(a) pB < pnb, and qB > qnb. Consequently, CSB > CSnb.
15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3555348
(b) ΠB > Πnb and WB > Wnb under A2. 2
Proposition 2 states that firms hire overconfident managers, and they make decisions
that induce higher productions, lower prices, and higher consumer surplus. Moreover, if
the extend of spillover effects is sufficiently strong, then, delegation and overconfidence
increase profits and welfare. In what follows, we compare the equilibrium outcomes
under Cournot and Bertrand.
Proposition 3 Suppose A1 and A2 hold.
(a) αC > αB.
(b) There exists a unique v2 = v2(b, β) such that
xC > xB > xnc > xnb if v < v2xC > xnc > xB > xnb if v > v2.2
In Proposition 3, we show that the degree of overconfidence and the size of over-
investment are higher in Cournot competition. Figure 3 illustrates R&D investment
levels comparison for parameters: a = 1, c = 0.95, b = 0.5, β = 0.86, and v2 =
3.04891 > 2.10526 = 2a
c
, with β > 0.285714 = b
2−b2 .
xC
xB
xnc
xnb
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
v
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
xC,xB ,xnc,xnb
(a) xC > xB > xnc > xnb and v < v2
xC
xnc
xB
xnb
3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
v
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
xC,xB ,xnc,xnb
(b) xC > xnc > xB > xnb and v > v2
Figure 3: Comparison of R&D investment levels
Note that Qiu (1997) shows that without delegation, xnc > xnb. We find that our model
with delegation leads to intermediate comparison between xB and xnc. The next result
compares quantity, price, and consumer welfare.
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Proposition 4 Suppose A1 and A2 hold. There exists a unique v3 = v3(b, β):qB > qC > qnb > qnc and pB < pC < pnb < pnc if v < v3qB > qnb > qC > qnc and pB < pnb < pC < pnc if v > v32
From Proposition 4, it is immediate that qB > qC and pB < pC whatever the productiv-
ity of the R&D technology. Therefore, consumer welfare is higher under Bertrand com-
petition, i.e., CSB > CSC . Figures 4 and 5 illustrate equilibrium prices and quantities
for parameters: a = 1, c = 0.95, b = 0.288, β = 0.86, and v3 = 3.00703 > 2.10526 =
2a
c
,
with β > 0.15023 = b
2−b2 . Proposition 4 shows that delegation makes competition
stronger and more aggressive under Bertrand and less aggressive under Cournot com-
petition.
qB
qC
qnb
qnc
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
v
0.030
0.032
0.034
0.036
0.038
qB ,qC,qnb ,qnc
(a) qB > qC > qnb > qnc and v < v3
qB
qC
qnb
qnc
3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
v
0.026
0.027
0.028
0.029
0.030
0.031
qB ,qC,qnb ,qnc
(b) pB < pC < pnb < pnc and v < v3
Figure 4: Comparison of equilibrium quantities
pB
pC
pnb
pnc
2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
v
0.954
0.956
0.958
0.960
0.962
pB ,pC,pnb ,pnc
(a) qB > qnb > qC > qnc and v > v3
pB
pC
pnb
pnc
3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
v
0.960
0.961
0.962
0.963
0.964
0.965
0.966
0.967
pB ,pC,pnb ,pnc
(b) pB < pnb < pC < pnc and v > v3
Figure 5: Comparison of equilibrium prices
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4. The Four-stage game
In this section, we suppose that each firm can make only two types of binding contracts
with shareholders: the delegation contract (D) and the non-delegation contract (ND).
If firm i chooses the delegation contract, this means that it will have to delegate the
R&D investments and production decisions to a manager whatever action the com-
petitor, firm j, j 6= i, takes. If firm i chooses the non-delegation contract, it commits
to making its strategic decisions without hiring a manager independently of the ac-
tion of the competitor. Consider a four-stage game where firms first simultaneously
commit themselves to a type of contract and afterward compete depending upon the
chosen types of arrangements and the three-stage game under quantity competition
described in section 2. Restricting attention to sub-game perfect equilibria of the four-
stage game, we show that it is a dominant strategy for firm i to choose the delegation
contract and hire an overconfident manager.
Let consider firm i, i = 1, 2. In the first stage, if both firms choose the delegation
contract, D, then both firms enjoy the Cournot profits ΠC . If they decide to choose
the non-delegation contract, then each firm receives its profit Πnc. Denote Π
i
C−ND firm
i’s profit when i chooses non-delegation contract, and the competition firm j chooses
the delegation contract, and ΠiC−D firm i’s profit when i chooses the delegation contract
and the competition firm j chooses the non-delegation contract. In the first stage, the
firm i, i = 1, 2, faces the payoff matrix described in Figure 6.
Firm j
D ND
Firm i
D
ND
ΠC
ΠiC−ND
ΠiC−D
Πnc
Figure 6: Payoff Matrix (Four-stage game)
When firms choose different strategies in the first stage, the firm that commits to
18
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delegate its investment and production decisions chooses the equilibrium level of con-
fidence:
αD = a+
2(2 + b)(b− 2β)2(a− c)v
∆D
{
(2− b)2(2 + b)v − 2(1− β)(2− bβ)}
with ∆D = −8(2− bβ)2(1− β2)2 + 4(2− bβ)2(12− 4bβ − 8β2 − b2(2− 3β2))v − 6(4−
b2)2(2 − bβ)2v2 + (4 − b2)4v3. Note that under A1, ∆D > 0, and αD > a. After
computation, we report that:
ΠiC−D =
(a− c)2v
∆D
{
(2− b)2(2 + b)v − 2(1− β)(2− bβ)}2 , and
ΠiC−ND =
v(a− c)2(v(4− b2)2 − 2(2− bβ)2)
∆2D

4(1− β)2(1 + β)(2− bβ)
− 2(2− b)(2− bβ)(4 + b− 2(1 + b)β)v
+ (2− b)3(2 + b)2v2

2
.
In appendix, we show that, under A1, ΠC > Π
i
C−ND, and Π
i
C−D > Πnc, for i = 1, 2.
It follows that it is a dominant strategy for firms to choose delegation, and therefore,
hire overconfident managers. Proposition 5 states the result.
Proposition 5 In the four-stage game, it is a dominant strategy for form i to choose
the delegation contract. 2
Note that Proposition 5 also holds when firms compete under price competition after
the first stage. Our result is similar to the finding by Kyle and Wang (1997). In
a standard Cournot duopoly model of informed speculation with two traders, Kyle
and Wang (1997) show that overconfidence can persist and survive in the long run
since it may strictly dominate rationality. We provide a similar conclusion in product-
market competition when firms commit to a specific corporate governance before the
market competition. In a competitive framework, information about demand is a cru-
cial advantage for profit-maximizing firms. Given that delegation may provide more
information about markets to firms or reduce uncertainty, then, delegating strategic
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decisions to managers could be an optimal managerial decision for firms (e.g., Bhard-
waj (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Mackey (2008), Bloom et al. (2012), Liozu and
Hinterhuber (2013), Kala (2019)). In our setting, we assume that managers and firms’
shareholders have the same interests. However, in other frameworks, managers might
be at odds with the principal (or firm’s owner). For instance, the manager can use his
or her superior informational advantage to make decisions against the objectives of the
principal. In that case, delegation in a competitive market might not be an optimal
strategy for firms (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2007), Alonso et al. (2008), Ruzzier (2018)).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a framework to examine the relationship between personal
characteristics of managers in firms and welfare in product markets. For strategic
reasons, firms decide to delegate innovation and production decisions to managers who
have over-estimate demands in a differentiated duopoly with R&D competition. We
show that overconfident managers over-invest in cost-reducing R&D investments and
produce more output in markets. The size of over-investment and over-production is
large when firms compete in quantities than in prices. If R&D productivity is low,
and spillovers are strong, our equilibrium outcomes induce higher welfare relative to
competition modes with no delegation.
Appendix A. Proof of Results
Proof (Proposition 1) (a) Comparing quantities give
qC =
{
1 +
4(2β − b)2(1 + β)(2− bβ)
(4− b2)∆C
}
qnc.
Given that β 6= b
2
, it is immediate that qC > qnc. Given that pC−pnc = −(1+b)(qC−qnc)
and CSC − CSnc = (1 + b)(q2C − q2nc), it follows that pC < pnc and CSC > CSnc.
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(b) With the help of Wolfram Research Inc. (2019), we can write
ΠC − Πnc = 16(a− c)
2(2− bβ)(2β − b)3v2
∆2C ∆
2
f(b, β, v),
where f(b, β, v) = f0(b, β) +f1(b, β)v+f2(b, β)v
2, with f0(b, β) = 2(1 +β)
2(2− bβ)(4 +
b − 2(1 + b)β), f1(b, β) = −(2 + b)2(2 − bβ)(8 + 6β − b(3 + 4β)), and f2(b, β) =
(2− b)2(2 + b)4 > 0.
The function f(b, β, .) is convex in v, and there are two real solutions vf1 and v
f
2 (with
vf1 < v
f
2 ) to equation f(b, β, v) = 0 for any b and β. By definition, f(b, β, v) > 0 for
v > vf2 . Given that any v that satisfies A1 is such that v > v
f
2 , it follows that for any
b and β, f > 0, and sign (ΠC − Πnc) = sign (2β − b). It is immediate that ΠC > Πnc
if and only if β > b
2
.
(c) In the same manner, as in (b), we can write
WC −Wnc = 8(2− bβ)(2β − b)
2(a− c)2v2
∆2C ∆
2
g(b, β, v),
where g(b, β, v) = g0(b, β) + g1(b, β)v+ g2(b, β)v
2, with g0(b, β) = 2(1 +β)
2(2− bβ)(8−
b2(3 + b) + 16β + 4bβ − 2(1 + b)(6 − b2)β2) < 0, g1(b, β) = 2(2 + b)2(−2 + bβ)(8 +
b(−6 + (−2 + b)b) + 28β + (−3 + b)b(4 + 3b)β + 2(8 + b(−5 + (−2 + b)b))β2) > 0, and
g2(b, β) = (2− b)2(2 + b)5(1− b+ (3− b)β) < 0.
Note that sign (WC −Wnc) = sign (g(b, β, v)). The function g(b, β, .) is convex in v,
and there are two real solutions vg1 and v
g
2 (with v
g
1 < v
g
2) to equation g(b, β, v) = 0 for
any b and β. Any v that satisfies A1 is such that v > vg1 . Since g(b, β, .) is convex,
g(b, β, v) < 0 if vg1 < v < v
g
2 and g(b, β, v) > 0 if v > v
g
2 . Therefore, WC < Wnc if
v < vg2 and WC > Wnc if v > v
g
2 . Consider v1 = v
g
2(b, β). 
Proof (Proposition 2) (a) Comparing prices gives:
pB
pnb
− 1 = −(a− c)v
∆B
4(1 + β)(2β − b2β − b)2(2− b2 − bβ)
v(4− b2)(1 + b)(a(1− b) + c)− a(1 + β)(2− b2 − bβ) .
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Under A1, v(4− b2)(1 + b)(a(1− b) + c)− a(1 + β)(2− b2 − bβ) > 0 and Φ > 0. For
any b and β, it is evident that 2 − b2 − bβ > 0. For any b and β, with β 6= b
2−b2 , we
have 2 − b2 − bβ > 0 and (2β − b2β − b)2 > 0 so that pB
pnb
− 1 < 0. With pnb > 0, we
can conclude that pB < pnb. From market demands, qB − qnb = − 11+b(pB − pnb), and
CSB − CSnb = (1 + b)(q2B − q2nb). Consequently, qB > qnb, and CSB > CSnb.
(b) We can write
ΠB − Πnb = 8(a− c)
2v2((2− b2)β − b)3(2− b2 − bβ)
(1 + b)Φ2 ∆2B
h(b, β, v),
where h(b, β, v) = h0(b, β) + h1(b, β)v+ h2(b, β)v
2, with h0(b, β) = 2(1− b)(1 + β)2(4 +
b− b2(2− β)− 2β− 2bβ)(2− b2− bβ) > 0, h1(b, β) = −(2− b)2(1 + b)(2− b2− bβ)(8 +
6β − b(3 + 4β + b(4 + 3β))) < 0, and h2(b, β) = (2− b)4(1− b)(1 + b)2(2 + b)2 > 0.
The function h(b, β, .) is convex in v, and there are two real solutions vh1 and v
h
2 to
equation h(b, β, v) = 0 for any b and β. The comparison between vh1 and v
h
2 depends on
the difference between β and b
2−b2 . Also, sign (ΠB−Πnb) = sign [(2−b2)β−b)h(b, β, v)].
Under A2, we have β > b
2−b2 . It follows that (2 − b2)β − b > 0, and vh1 > vh2 . Under
A1, any v is such that v > vh1 . By definition, h(b, β, v) > 0 for any v > v
h
1 so that
ΠB − Πnb is positive and ΠB > Πnb. Thus WB > Wnb when β > b2−b2 under A2. 
Proof (Proposition 3) (a) We have
αB − αC = 1
∆C∆B
{I(b, β, v)∆C − J(b, β, v)∆B} ,
where I(b, β, v) = a(1− b)[(4− b2)v − 2(1− β2)][(2− b)2(1 + b)(2 + b)v − 2(1 + β)(2 +
−b2 − bβ)] − 2(2 − b)(2β − b2β − b)2cv, and J(b, β, v) = a[v(4 − b2) − 2(1 − β2)][(2 −
b)(2 + b)2v− 2(1 +β)(2− bβ)]− 2(2 + b)(2β− b)2cv. Under A1 and A2, the expression
I(b, β, v)∆C − J(b, β, v)∆B < 0. Therefore αC > αB.
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(b)
xC
xB
−1 = b
3v
(1− b)(2− b2 − bβ)∆C [v(1−b)(4−b
2)2(1+β)−2(1−β)(2−bβ)(2−b2−bβ)].
Given A1 and A2, it is immediate that v(1− b)(4− b2)2(1 + β)− 2(1− β)(2− bβ)(2−
b2 − bβ) > 0. Then, xC > xB. It is also straightforward to verify that xnc > xnb under
the same conditions.
We also write
xB
xnc
− 1 = v(2− b)
(2− bβ)∆B k(b, β, v),
where k(b, β, v) = k0(b, β)+vk1(b, β), with k0(b, β) = 4b
3−2b5 +10b3β−2b5β+16β2 +
2b5β2 + 4b3(−1 + β)β2 − 2b4(1 + β) + 2b4β2(1 + β) + b2(4 − 8β2) − 8bβ(2 + β2) > 0,
and k1(b, β) = −8b3 + 6b5 − 8b3β + 6b5β + 4b4(1 + β)− b6(1 + β)− (b7)(1 + β) < 0.
Note that sign (xB − xnc) = sign k(b, β, v). Let denote vk = −k0k1 . Given any b and
β, k(b, β, v) > 0 if and only if v < vk. We conclude that xB > xnc if v < v
k, and the
result follows. Take v2 = v
k. 
Proof (Proposition 4) (a) We write
qB − qC = (a− c)v
(1 + b)∆C∆B
L(b, β, v),
where L(b, β, v) = [v(4−b2)2(1−b2)−2(2−b2−bβ)2]∆C−(1+b)[v(4−b2)2−2(2−bβ)2]∆B.
Under both A1 and A2, L(b, β, v) is positive for any v, b and β so that qB − qC > 0,
i.e., qB > qC . Therefore, given that pB − pC = −(1 + b)(qB − qC), it follows that
pB < pC , and CSB > CSC .
qC − qnb = (a− c)v
Φ∆C
M(b, β, v), 
where L(b, β, v) = m0(b, β) + m1(b, β)v + m2(b, β)v
2, with m0(b, β) = −8b2 + 12b3β +
12b3β2 − 4b4β2 − 4b4β3 + 32β2(1 + β)− 16bβ(1 + β)(2 + β2) + 8b2β(−1 + 2β(1 + β)),
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m1(b, β) = 64b
2 − 24b4 + 2b6 + 32b2β − 32b3β − 16b4β + 8b5β + 2b6β + 8b4β2 − 2b6β2,
and m2(b, β) = −64b2 + 48b4 − 12b6 + b8 < 0. The function M(b, β, .) is a concave
function in v, and there are two real solutions vm1 and v
m
2 (with v
m
2 > v
m
1 ) to equation
M(b, β, v) = 0 for any b and β. Under A1, any v is such that v > vm1 . By definition
M(b, β, v) is positive if v < vm2 , and M(b, β, v) is negative if v > v
m
2 . Consider v3 = v
m
2 ,
and the inequalities follow.
(c) ΠC − ΠB = (a−c)2v∆2C∆2B {N1(b, β)∆
2
B −N2(b, β)∆2C} > 0, and WB −WC > 0.
Proof (Proposition 5)
ΠC − ΠiC−ND =
v(a− c)2
∆2C∆
2
D
O(b, β, v),
where O(b, β, v) = [−2(2−bβ)2(2−2β2−(4−b2)v)2 +v(−2(2−bβ)2 +(4−b2)2v)2]∆2D−
[(−2(2− bβ)2 + (4− b2)2v)(4(1− β2)(1− β)(−2 + bβ) + 2(2− b)(2− bβ)(4 + b− 2(1 +
b)β)v − (2− b)3(2 + b)2v2)2]∆2C . Under A1, O(b, β, v) > 0, for all b and β. Therefore,
ΠC > Π
i
C−ND.
Similarly,
ΠiC−D − Πnc =
v(a− c)2
∆2∆2D
8(b− 2β)4(2− bβ)2v. 
Assuming β 6= b
2
, it is evident that ΠiC−D > Πnc.
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